

JÓZSEF SZÁJER

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OF GLOBALIST
UTOPIANISM
AND ITS
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THE OPIUM OF GLOBALIST UTOPIANISM AND ITS ANTIDOTE

The title of this lecture is a paraphrase of the subtitle of Miklós Zrínyi's *Don't Hurt my Hungarians: An antidote to the Turkish poison*, adapted to the conditions of our age. My intention is to draw a parallel between the two eras, the 21st century and the threats facing Hungary in the 17th century, paying particular attention to the prospects for national self-defence. For great Zrínyi's era, although far less fortunate, more bitter and significantly harder than our own, shows many similarities to our age. The sharp eyes of the Viceroy spotted immediately what chasing the Eastern Muslim giant from Hungary through help from Western empires rather than by ourselves involved. He knew perfectly what it

meant for our nation; and what price it would entail. He drew the proper conclusions and proclaimed a programme clearly stating that if we wanted to survive, we had to bolster the guarantee of our national strength and autonomy – that is, we needed a Hungarian army.

There is one more trait that makes our world reminiscent of what happened three or four hundred years ago. Sharp-eyed Zrínyi also clearly recognised that there was an intellectual dimension to the threat facing Hungary; and that approaching our country's problems the wrong way or complacently would cause more trouble than the invading enemy itself. In other words, when speaking about our own military force, we don't just have Realpolitik or specific military issues in mind – we ourselves and our self-esteem are also at stake.

The drug in the subtitle of Zrínyi's work was called in contemporary Hungarian *áfium*, which of course means opium, a substance already well-known at the time and used to disturb minds and confuse the human intellect. Losing your mind and consciousness is worse than slavery. Inaction and impotence inject false ideas and illusions into our minds as *afiums*. When discussing the remedies against *áfium*, Zrínyi uses another Latin word – *antidotum*. The meaning is perhaps even clearer to us than it was to Hungarians of his time – we call it 'antidote'. It means a substance that can defeat a given type of poison.

We are witnessing a shift in historical trends in today's world. My analysis is centred on a system of delusions threatening national cohesion and the idea of the nation-state itself – a system of delusions that has been consciously constructed and supported deploying enormous material and intellectual energies.

Mine is a political analysis, for I am a politician, not a scientist. A politician who thinks – and I hope this is not an oxymoron.

We are witnessing a reshuffle on a global scale. The main political dividing line nowadays is no longer the one separating Left and Right. Although the intellectual and material conditions defining those two sides still exist, describing politics along these traditional lines increasingly misses the target and becomes less and less accurate. The new power relations and the concrete and spiritual struggle for control over the world can much more clearly be described in terms of a different rivalry; between on one hand a kind of globalism that purports to be something new, and on the other the system of nation-states that has provided the foundation of the world order to date.

The old dividing line is gradually becoming blurred, while the new one is taking a more definite shape. What the future will look like will to a large extent depend on the outcome of this struggle. That process has remained hidden from the eyes of many for a long time. The globalist side was especially active in hiding the conflict behind a variety of superficial appearances and pretences, but it can hardly be kept hidden any longer. It permeates our worldview, determining our actions and our ideas about what we must do.

The great shift which made the confrontation between the competing theories about the world publicly undeniable was triggered by the huge transfer of populations that peaked in 2015. This most spectacular clash to date of reality versus constructionist utopianism – that is, of national forces versus globalism – took place before our very eyes. It was witnessed in the form of the military-scale march of masses

sweeping through our country, and the political reactions to it. The great transfer of populations in 2015 was a shocking moment in a process whereby the world is being reinterpreted, because it became visible to everyone and palpable to us in this region that a huge transformation was underway. That shift could be photographed most spectacularly and from the most authentic angle in this very region – and from Hungary best of all. The image of an apparently unstoppable movement of populations across the borders in the very centre of Europe made a lasting impact on the way we think of society today.

Over the previous decades the migration process in Western Europe had been a gradual one. It was mostly perceived only once it had happened, and its impact in transforming peoples' views was gradual. Those who had a vested interest in keeping that gradual process going had a vast array of means and a long time at their

disposal. In this part of the world, on the other hand, the transfer of populations in 2015 was as swift, unexpected and strong in its impact as a blitz. Its effects were correspondingly drastic.

During that year, threats which had only been virtual and had played no real role in our social inter-relations unexpectedly became real and frightening, exposing our states' capacity for resistance and self-defence to an unprecedented challenge. The image of the endless stream of people crossing borders uncontrollably remained burned into our retinas, reshaping our attitudes and reframing the way we interpret our social relations.

That great procession streamed across the very borders that we had celebrated a few decades ago as having been opened and spiritualised in what was perceived as one of the most important, elating and

liberating conquests of the globalising world. The function of the physical border that had been so natural for centuries was suddenly recognised again by all sober people in 2015. Since we were confronted with the border's absence in a critical situation, that perhaps most important symbol of the globalist world order – its proclaimed unlimited openness – found itself in the crosshairs. It was hit hard and shown to be increasingly unfit for political use. The sight of the great procession irrevocably destroyed public faith in the open solutions offered by the new world which began in the late 20th century, and their capacity to satisfy even the most elementary security needs of our societies. States which had previously been considered as icons of precision and professionalism in matters of security, and as having the best security authorities in the world, stood paralysed facing that scene with both hands in the air. Politicians and the media were confused and struggled to find the right words; only

a few could break free from the straitjacket of political correctness. The lack of control, the feeling of helplessness that many citizens experienced are still with us well after the foolhardy political decisions and actual events. Many people still cannot digest them. The attitudes of the people, their sense of security and their relationship with world affairs, have changed as well.

The counter-effect – our Zrínyi would say the *antidotum*, the medicine – was no less powerful in its impact on history. When land, population and sovereignty were spectacularly recovered, when control through fence-building and bolstering border protection was swiftly regained, people lived a great historical moment of recovering collective faith in the capacity of the political sphere to act. The scales dropped from our eyes after our vision had been blurred by various *afiums*. The more courageous ones even stopped wearing muzzles. Yes, that was a revelation,

a great collective celebration of our strength, after all, to protect ourselves. We discovered that we had been seeking the solution in the wrong place, because we had suppressed all those words that should have been pronounced for a long time.

Increasingly large numbers of our citizens realised not only that the elementary guarantees of safety they had considered natural were not evident to the hegemonic, purportedly benevolent and progressive forces, but also that the rigid doctrines of those forces were the actual source of the threat. No big intellectual exercise was required to understand how our classical Left-versus-Right debates over redistribution or morality, which are so important and divisive in peacetime, are being suddenly dwarfed beneath the shadow of an individual and collective existential threat. That danger was threatening the bases of our existence: our only-recently regained European way of life and our

enfeebled Christian worldview – which has been gaining an important new mission – as well as our identity, national feelings and traditions; the most important links that bind us together.

Hungarians are not a nation of amnesiacs; we do honour history and intend, what's more are able, to learn its lessons. We cannot forget 150 years of Ottoman rule after we were colonised by the Turkish Sultan 500 years ago. Our experience is very different from the West's – they colonised the Middle East, while we were colonised by it. That difference in historical experience is one important reason why our reactions to Muslim immigration differ. The images of Christian Churches converted into mosques, the fall of heroic and triumphant Buda Castle only to be downgraded to a colonial outpost are deep and still aching wounds in our Christian and European identity. Our function as the sole and last bastion defending Christianity is

a basic feature of Hungarian national identity, a fundamental myth or, to use a more up-to-date expression, the central narrative of our history. It forges together the defence of Europe, Hungary and Christianity as it fills our life with a mission, a shared experience uniting all Hungarians with a national goal.

The impact of the new contest of globalist versus national outlooks in Europe led to the fundamental subversion of party structures and by implication the structures of public power.

Parliamentary decision-making was challenged by an increasing number of only slightly-veiled globalist forces, hiding behind for instance the doctrine of human rights or the rule of law, seeking to weaken the majoritarian principle of democratic elections. Democracy, being a fundamental bulwark of European political civilisation, cannot openly be chal-

lenged; such a challenge would simply not be acceptable. Unfortunately, I must pessimistically add ‘for the moment’, because we can’t tell how long it will remain unacceptable.

Indeed, the globalist drive aimed at crushing national resistance may swiftly reach a point where it realises that it can only succeed by frontally attacking the system hindering its designs; that is, the system of majoritarian elections, based on the competition of political parties, structured within the framework of the national demos – the people. I wish I were wrong. We will have to mobilise all our forces to defend democracy, majoritarian elections, and the capacity of national governments to act against attacks from abundantly and globally financed NGOs; from overreaching international organisations, the elevation of international law and the unlimited rule of the judiciary.

In recent years individual political parties, during their voluntary or forcible transition from the traditional Left versus Right ideological divisions to the new globalist versus national setup, have taken existential decisions which will determine their strength today and in the future. Certain tendencies are already visible. For instance, traditionally left-wing or liberal parties tend to join the globalist field, while the old right-wing ones have transitioned into the socialist category; but characteristic differences have been to a large extent dampened by considerations of power, European politics, or local, cultural, ethnic and other factors.

In addition to their globalist approach, the shared characteristics of Left and Right have been further accentuated by the massive loss of confidence threatening political forces in general, as well as by their more frequent coalescing into so-called grand coalitions.

Those two factors are interrelated. The Left is the more endangered species of course. It is no coincidence that in giving up its role of representing the masses and of uniting the national community in people's parties, the socialist camp has chosen as the main focus of its worldview the human rights doctrine and so-called constitutional patriotism, those highly individualistic doctrines seeking to dissolve conflicting ideas in the most abstract notions, in order to unite its ever-more restricted electoral basis which represents ever-more marginal sections of society. It has chosen so-called constitutional patriotism, a notion devoid of any content or emotions, as its main framework to interpret the surrounding world.

The Left is trying to impose that pattern onto its new strategic ally, the Right, which is apparently also willing to dissolve its original identity into the increasingly doctrinaire liberal worldview. (Unfortunately,

they are more and more successful.) The difference in their capacity to win over voters, that is the incomparably graver crisis facing the Left and the relative temporary success of the Right, can be explained by the Right's apparent 'people's party' character. They have already created a common basis for a large portion of the traditional 'status quo Left' and 'status quo Right' to melt together, clinging ever more closely to one another, into the globalist section of the new ideological matrix of party politics. The traditional sphere once comfortably inhabited by the many parties which are losing ground is shrinking. And the continuously-expanding sovereignist side – which is called populist by its opponents – has found its vocation mainly at the expense of the former big forces and in its own attitude against the national establishments and supranational organisations. Even the remaining differences between traditional Left and Right thus appear doomed to dissolve.

As shown by the democratic elections held in Europe since the 2015 shift, electoral gains have only been accessible for traditional and new parties – most of them coming from the Right – which have found a place on the national side of the new globalist versus national setup. (With the notable exception of Mr. Macron's initial success in France.) In the eyes of the electorate, the re-distribution issues dominant in the Left versus Right divide have been superseded by matters of security, which play into the hands of the sovereignists. There is quite a bit of scuffling over here, on the pro-nation side as well, with lots of adventurers around. Only time will tell whether the new, inexperienced parties will manage to consolidate their positions – competition will eliminate the unfit. Nevertheless, there is still more space available. The old mass parties have largely abandoned the principle of popular representation and that gap must be filled by something. That something may temporarily mean the

anger of protest, but that will not do the job in the long run and positive visions must be produced sooner or later.

The invalidation of the traditional Left versus Right framework created a new situation in Hungary's party politics which cannot be understood using the old schemes. Many people with traditionally left-wing attitudes towards values, morality and redistribution have cast their votes for the right-wing government, which laid the accent on stopping immigration and bolstering security. Despite a series of failures, Hungary's Left still doesn't realise what the people noticed a long time ago – that the significance of the by-now-central issue of immigration goes well beyond the issue itself. That finding was corroborated by surveys which have shown significant increases in support for classical right-wing values in Hungary. Values that were declared to be in decline and dying out – family or Christianity and the

protection of national culture – had long been abandoned and ceded to the Right without the least pang of remorse by the Left. Yet now we are witnessing the resurgence of these values in the new interpretive space created in response to the immigration threat. Even many people well beyond the usual circle of pro-government voters now believe that the protection of our 'national, Hungarian, Christian culture' is the duty of the state.

Changing value preferences have reshaped electoral maps throughout Europe. It is instructive to compare the different turns that events have taken in Germany and in Austria. While the combined strength of the traditional German parties that coalesced on a globalist footing has been severely reduced by the electorate (with a resulting severely-curbed room for manoeuvre), Austria's Christian Democrats, who were able to abandon their classical stance for the

new setup defined by the immigration crisis, have experienced first a renewal and then expansion of their influence. Those changes also produced a restructuring of relations among the German parties which had remained within the old setup; for instance, they made it possible for the Free Democrats who took a more characteristic stance on immigration to overcome their near-existential crisis.

Elsewhere, in Italy Silvio Berlusconi's right-wing party has lost a lot of votes because it remains stuck within the right angle of the globalist space, while Matteo Salvini's Lega has filled the sovereigntist field, multiplying its strength. Poland's centre-right party, the Civic Platform, has remained on the globalist field and must now coalesce and merge with practically the whole of the liberal and left-wing side (its erstwhile fiercest enemies) in order to compete with PiS, its sovereigntist, anti-immigration rival which identifies

its roots in the legendarily combative Solidarity movement.

We Hungarians have frequently been targeted by globalist utopianism – opposing it sometimes just naïvely and unconsciously, but at other times consciously. Over the past few years, however, we have had the distinguished ‘honour’, on an almost non-stop basis, of seeing all self-respecting globalist forces exercise their martial skills on us, in the figure of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. As their efforts have had only marginal impact within Hungary, they are investing huge energies of power, pressure, money and media to eliminate us and sweep us out of their way. (In an attempt to discourage any other courageous peoples from potentially following our path.) The utopian globalist forces who are in control of the worldwide public sphere today are insistently trying to persuade us that we are not modern enough, not sufficiently

progressive and have been atavistically and bigotedly stuck in the past. This is how Frans Timmermans, First Vice President of the European Commission expressed himself on ATV Hungary recently: ‘Hungarians are not open enough.’¹

We can be assured that while he was preaching openness to us, the right honourable gentleman (or comrade) also had in his pocket the tool designed to open us up – the multifunctional spiritual tin opener. Just like its physical counterpart, the spiritual tin opener is a shining tool that opens, tears up and cuts through anything closed and not sufficiently inclusive. Its edge makes a damp noise when hitting the tin, it is readily at hand and its use can be learned through just a little practice or a short sensitising course, because it only consists of a few sentences. The more sensitive

1 Egyenes Beszéd, ATV, February 15, 2019.

souls, Hungarians for instance, can recognise it from a great distance.

Our predilection to think in terms of a nation, a community, or to believe that it is good for countries to have borders, and to think that apart from our rights we also have duties, is for Timmermans and his like utterly provincial and authoritarian. Our way of thinking which distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens, Hungarians and non-Hungarians, and what’s more, prioritises the former, is considered by them hopelessly exclusive. Our pride in our shared national history, in having survived the centuries on this land, makes no sense to them and is even seen as pure chauvinism in a world where all peoples necessarily must melt into a multicultural society. They find it outlandish that, for some reason, instead of the greatness of the world we somehow feel safer at home; that we cherish our tragic heroes as well as our national

spiritual resources. They ask themselves in shock why we are not swift and enthusiastic enough in joining them, the true well-wishers and saviours of the world, those who always know the only and correct answer to all questions raised by our era, in some of their brainless campaigns.

We shouldn't doubt that they meticulously note and keep a record of all our deviations from the mainstream they dominate. We provincial rednecks of course humbly admit that we struggle to find our way among those things. We only cheer up when seeing them sometimes get lost in their intricate labyrinths of inter-sectionalism; for instance, when they worry if a man is entitled to give way to a lady or help her take off her coat. Within certain groups of people, reality has been overwhelmed by the ideology, the delusions and *afium* – when it comes to issues unfortunately more important than the ones just mentioned – to an extent

that is barely distinguishable from the spirit that once ruled in the court of the Sultan or under Communism, as we had the opportunity to experience. In Istanbul or Moscow all chieftains were eagerly trying to find out the latest idea that occurred to the Sultan, the Czar or the Party secretary-general, the knowledge of which was the most elementary condition of survival. Knowing the last but one would not work. And there too, one was not allowed to utter the wrong words.

Those circles don't understand why we love such concrete and finite things as our immediate surroundings, our country, our families, especially given that enthusiasm about the abstract infinite and the whole globe requires much less effort and is meant to make us feel more happily high. Yes, they are right. We Hungarians and other Europeans who are sticking to the binding power of our national feelings do harbour some kind of inexplicable commitment and fidelity

(fides in Latin). Loyalty to the idea that we live for something; that our existence has a purpose; that there is a reason for us being different from others. And we even have the nerve to be proud of all that. As Mihaly Babits writes in his essay on ‘The crowd and the nation’, Hungarians have a special idea of their own, one that doesn’t depend on the exact number of its supporters at any particular time.

Fortunately enough, given our many Western friends, we Hungarians are not faring too badly. There are many other people throughout Europe who support the idea of national cohesion and its importance – and their voice, our voice, is getting stronger. As the new divisions have set in, doubts about the indisputable, still-hegemonic ideas of an open, individualistic society have been swiftly spreading. Symbolic borderlessness was not the only such idea to suffer a fatal blow. Beside it, we can see all the elements and

key notions of open society fading at an increasing speed and losing their intellectual appeal. The little boy watching the procession along the promenade has already proclaimed in his thin voice: ‘The King has no clothes!’ We do know what follows from there. All great implosions begin with authorities being unmasked. Ideas purportedly self-evident and declared beyond question turn out to be unfit to give the right answers to the challenges of our era, especially to the ones concerning our security. We have realised that repugnance towards history, tradition, faith and common sense tends to disarm our society and prevent our politicians from taking the necessary action. Cracks have thus appeared in the foundations of the globalist doctrine, until very recently still proclaimed as eternal and, somewhat prematurely, as definitively victorious.

The great shift in interpreting the world which was catalysed by the 2015 immigration crisis, experienced directly in our region and more indirectly elsewhere, called our attention to historical processes which, although real, had thus far remained latent.

We Hungarians and the peoples of central Europe may consider ourselves lucky because at this important crossroads we have a clear view of the alternative models of our future. We know what those countries have become which – whether out of philanthropic naïveté, laziness, bad conscience, impotence, or led by the desire for economic advantage – decided to transform themselves into immigrant societies. Or perhaps did so without making up their minds because, unlike us Hungarians, they haven't had a democratic moment to take that decision. Many of them will only face that moment May 2019, in elections to the European parliament, because they haven't been

courageous enough to stand up against the process and have lost their ability to survive and the qualities that once made them great and successful.

We are lucky first of all because, unlike many West European countries, we still do have a choice. As we have learned from István Bibó, but also from our own millennial history, great national enterprises are sometimes pathetically botched. Our Polish friends even lost their own state for a whole century. We have had to fight hard for everything that is good in life – for our friends, our families, our country, our liberty and our rights. This 'must', the need to fight, has not been relegated to the past by the huge changes of our times; on the contrary, it is becoming ever more imperative.

Delusions are auxiliary instruments used by influential forces to fool the world – but sometimes we also fool ourselves. We have rather clear ideas about what

sovereignism means, what a world order based on cooperation among national communities or nation-states, or another Westphalia, is about. When shaping those concepts, we can, in fact, refer to our past and recent experience. On the other hand, grappling with the ideas of globalism, the global state, the structures of control over humanity as a whole, our job becomes a lot harder. In that case, our historical experience is of no help in defining the direction of future action, because we must see that supranational and imperial ambitions in Europe have failed one after another. Looking at modernity and our own region, we have had to put up with short-lived, violent, defunct imperial endeavours that intended to unite our continent sparing no human blood; based on the colonial pattern but with a lifespan of a century at the most or even shorter, and being asymmetrical anyway. But let us confess that the appeal of these past imperial endeavours is minimal. They are not even readily invoked as examples by

utopian globalism, because of their excessive violence, wars, and relations of subjugation.

We are left with the distant model of imperial Rome. Its example – as a result of the Church, its surviving representative as an apparently continuous, Catholic (that is, universal) organisational structure – still often offers a framework to rationally structure our ideas when we address the shared problems of the world in dimensions beyond national units. Yet the example of the Roman Empire, although not devoid of lessons, is too distant. Belgian historian David Engels has recently written an excellent book about this.² (Nomen est omen?) More recent experiences of the empires of Britain, France, Spain and Holland are unacceptably hierarchical, colonial and based on oppression. As for

2 David Engels: *A birodalomról való útján*. L'Harmattan, 2018.

the empires of Suleyman, Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin, they were short blind alleys, aggressive endeavours to spill blood in spreading an ideology.

In the absence of successful historical examples, today's believers in globalism are left with one single imperial pattern – the *afium* of utopianism. Utopians, rather than setting themselves normal, natural and attainable goals based on common sense, always refuse to take the existent as a starting point and consider instead the ideal and the illusory as being more important. Paper can bear any writing. Whether the aim supposedly to be pursued happens to be a utopia of eternal peace; a society free of wars and violence; full equality; a world without oppression; or mankind ecologically managing its resources and organised into efficient working structures, changes from one case to another. It now seems that globalist utopianism is finding the focal point of its utopias turning

from concreteness, rationality and history towards abstract ideas such as the principle of imposing armed discipline on international conflicts; global struggle against terrorism; soothing contrasts between North and South; stopping climate change; rolling back the networks of worldwide organised crime; and merging peacefully the populations of the world through migration. That project hasn't proved too successful so far.

A long list could be compiled of the advantages of a world better-organised, more peaceful, more just, that would deploy its resources for the good of the largest possible number of people – as well as a list of the traditional shared and national means still at our disposal to reach that goal. Our shared future depends on how we human beings, the nations of the world, are able to cooperate. Global problems require global answers, we are correctly reminded, but somehow the solutions

prioritised are always the untested dreamy ones, rather than the solutions based on experience at the national level or in cooperation among countries on an equal footing. We cannot turn a blind eye to the constant fatal mistake of utopias. The gap between reality and their universal, rational and spotlessly-constructed noble targets is unbridgeable, because constructionist utopias are groundless and devoid of any footing in the real world. They tend to draw their power from rootless, imaginary ideas of the future, construed in variants that contradict each other, rather than drawn from reality.

Utopias have no actual anthropology because rather than existing, fallible, frail, flesh-and-bone human beings, their starting point is an unreal ideal of man that has never existed in this world beyond their imagination. Therefore, when trying to put their far-fetched projects into practice, they ceaselessly

crash into the obstacle of the real world. In the course of the resulting serial failures, a moment soon arrives when real conditions and real human beings become the main enemies. From that point on they replace the problems that were meant to be solved as the adversary that must be overcome, in an effort to keep distant and unreachable imaginary goals alive. In fact, another delusion or *afium* of constructionist thinking – as we have learned from Roger Scruton, but also learned the hard way – is that it always expects the best and the most optimistic scenario to materialise. However, since the world is imperfect, mistakes are bound to occur, our actions never perfectly produce the result we expect them to deliver and the best option rarely materialises. That is when Option B is applied – which is always at hand and which is less peaceful, less devoid of pressure and violence. We have seen the like of that. Once Communist revolution was not victorious in the most advanced country of the

world or not simultaneously throughout the globe then, following the utopians' principle of the closing-down sale, we can very well put up with Soviet Russia alone. We shouldn't worry if the local population doesn't want that – they will be persuaded to like it. It will be enough to amend the plans and increase the pressure.

Utopians always know better about what is good for us. If people don't understand the noble targets and refuse to accept them spontaneously, they must be enlightened, and if that is not sufficient, they must be forced to understand. Once the levers of power have been grabbed, they must be used to promote the noble goal and to make the world a better place. Whether this is what happens in all theoretically-possible situations, we who confine our thoughts to reality, realists, prisoners of base matter, cannot tell; but we surely know that the utopian, national and international socialist

attempts of the recent past have all plunged societies into mass murderous terror.

We, anti-utopians who cherish common sense, real man, history and experience, having witnessed so many reality-denying utopias pitifully fail before our own eyes over the past centuries, can safely say that they are doomed to perish from the moment of their birth. The knowledge of the inevitable end of these ideals in the long run cannot, however, lure us into making concessions. We cannot allow them to unfold and strengthen, we can't stand idly by while they try to ruin our world on behalf of their fully-delirious or superficially-alluring ideas. Earlier, before the age of the expansive and aggressively invasive ideologies, people like ourselves had less reason to be concerned, because utopians had less chance to succeed and less means at their disposal. However, they have since been equipped by the modern age with the technical,

military, IT and industrial capabilities which make it possible for their erstwhile hopeless oppressive attempts at racial homogeneity, racist rule or full equality, violent class rule and proletarian dictatorship to survive long enough to cause grave and lasting damage. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that as they have abandoned faith – Christianity – they are left without any remnants of moral and intellectual scruples. With its new capabilities, technical and intellectual conquests, mankind has reached a stage in the modern era where it can annihilate itself.

We should not mistake their seemingly idealistic naivety, behind which a sharp eye will easily spot the kind of cynicism typical of world power ambitions, for a methodological mistake which can easily be corrected by adjusting some proportions, fastening a few support screws or displacing a few walls. That is their essential quality. The lofty ideas of utopian globalism

disguised in sheep's clothing are no exception. We can thus surely classify reality-denying globalist utopias as among the most dangerous instruments of our self-destruction.

But perhaps the most dangerous *afium* or delusion of globalist utopianism is its propensity to consider itself to be unprecedentedly open, enlightened, scientific and tolerant. It never misses an opportunity to self-assuredly and systematically share its positive opinion of itself with all of us. Its tolerance hardly goes beyond tolerating its own opinions, although even that might be exaggerated because they change so frequently, following the latest fashion. Overconfidence is never the best adviser. Anyone who is unable to doubt their purportedly grand ideas despises by definition other people's experiences and ignores authority. They are only a few steps from despising history and, as any good constructionist should, trying to erase the

cumulative experience of the ancestors as irrelevant. Another important *afium* of globalist utopianism is therefore its denial of history and its rejection of experience.

And yet, man remains the only one of the Earth's species whose offspring are not doomed to start from scratch at birth. Humanity has a huge advantage as compared to other species in its ability to record, transmit and learn from acquired experience. Anyone considering yesterday merely as an evil to be transcended, trashed and rejected is stifling their own source of life. Past experience is the source of the present and of the future. Not only because, as the commonplace goes, 'history is the teacher of life', but because it permeates all spheres of our lives as an existential, ontological foundation. St John Paul II's teachings serve as clear guidance, antidote and medicine. In his *Memory and Identity*, Wojtyła points out that nations are com-

munities held together by shared memory; the birth of European nations and states is directly linked to Christianity; national feelings stem from family, clan and tribe; the sufferings of the peoples of central and eastern Europe are important trials strengthening their identities through which communities learn the real value of freedom, including dimensions and commitments which are unknown to others in the absence of such a rich history of suffering.

That is a special knowledge we can transmit to others. What the Polish Pope said 25 years ago is even more valid for today's world which has relativised everything in the absence of authority and truth and thus denies historical experience. For decades we have witnessed its ills unfolding under our own gaze. Europe, the world that has abandoned God and Christianity, has lost the secure ground on which to build its future. That was a process which started with the denial

of Europe's thousands of years of history and of the tradition rooted in Judaism, Christianity and antiquity when, in a great drive to trash everything that was old, utopian globalism defined the date of the foundation of the European community as Year Zero of the new European era. That declaration in itself needn't have been a problem. The trouble was that at the same time it selectively discarded through its narrow ideological sieve everything that preceded it, branding history as a series of useless and harmful feuds, wars, aggressions, hostilities. Hardly anything soberly human or important in everyday life could get through that sieve. Such restrictive reinterpretation of history leaves little space for anything good and valuable that has happened over the past 2000 years. An eloquent example is the globalist *afium* which proclaims that the nation-state is the exclusive cause of all the troubles of our era, of the bloody wars of recent history and the wicked, vile destruction of European Jewry on an industrial scale.

Another example is the ensuing doctrine that the only way to prevent such horrors being repeated is to eliminate nations and nation-states by uniting mankind – and as a first step, Europeans – under one single joint government. The United States of Europe.

It is almost impossible to open any propaganda booklet issued by the European Union without reading in the first lines about egoistical and stubborn individual nations and how they are unable to understand the world – unlike the Union which represents their joint interests. In reality, no deep research is needed to realise how such a reductionist, one-sided and distorted representation of Europe's history is a rough caricature; and to what extent it is false and self-serving. The nations themselves are not thoughtless. They have perpetrated horrific crimes against themselves and each other; but wars, invasions and cases of extermination or subjugation of other peoples and communities

have never been triggered by some national ideal in itself. They were sparked, almost without exception, by ideas fuelled by destructive imperial ambitions. Just because a failure occurs in a basically well-functioning and useful device doesn't mean people trash the entire equipment, nor would it be wise for them to do so – it is enough to repair it. But trashing the nation-state is precisely what is being proposed. Nations are branded as guilty and their elimination as the only remedy.

This is another example where we can spot the mistaken, ideological logic – or rather lack of logic – of utopianism. All kinds of hierarchical and communitarian relations are interpreted by today's fashionably doctrinaire left-wing worldview as limitations to the liberty of the individual. Loyalty and fidelity are considered as merely servile attitudes; family as a scene of violence and domination; nations as a source of hatred towards other peoples. Those bonds are therefore

condemned to be torn apart. However, no intelligible, liveable and realistic linkages are proposed to replace them, save for the concept of world citizenry the like of which has never been seen and bears no content whatsoever.

It is no coincidence that doctrinaire utopian globalism pinpoints the nation as something that must be eliminated for the sake of the future and of 'world peace' – and thereby implicitly targets majoritarian democracy, which exists within the national framework. The cloven hoof is showing. Utopian globalism intends to get rid of the most obstinate obstacle in its way, which is why it lists the nation among the most revolting things ever produced by mankind. If it took itself and its own principles proclaimed elsewhere seriously, it should launch a crusade against imperialism and the imperial way of thinking. Yet it refrains from doing so for a good reason – it resembles imperialism

too much and feels a sometimes only thinly-veiled attraction to it.

The *afiums* of both a world empire and a Europe petrified into an empire and abandoning its earlier principles of equal rights and voluntary membership have one common antidote – strengthening national forces that are willing to cooperate with one another. To reference our shared central European experience again, let me borrow an important idea from a Polish colleague, Krzysztof Szczerski.³ As he sees it, our basic historical experience in this region is that the small and medium-sized nations of Central Europe have always fared well when national solidarity was strong among them and when great powers contemplating our region with greed in their eyes could be made interested in mutually-advantageous cooperation. This is therefore

3 Krzysztof Szczerski: *Az európai utópia*. Rézbong Kiadó, 2018.

also our most important argument in favour of a European Union which, rather than lecturing national communities, is based on the truly voluntary cooperation of equal nations. There are many such elements in how the Union functions today and the EU can be further shaped in a way to meet that fundamental criterion. It is up to us to make that happen.

Our countries which joined the Union in the early noughties with their own specific historical backgrounds, economically anaemic after decades under Communism, have never been offered the luxury of a calm life and safe testing of solutions. We were forced again and again to apply new, swift, mostly radical but also pragmatic and non-ideological methods to manage one crisis after another. Most importantly, throughout history, with our existence as a nation at the mercy of others, we saw our nationhood as our only framework for survival, freedom, democracy and

often as the single most stable and secure element of life. Europeans in our region were ultimately protected against the imperialisms of Suleyman, Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin by the indomitable power of national feelings and the nation state. For our countries of central Europe who were ruled by the Communist world empire, a strong commitment to our nations was paramount in surviving our recent past and gave us the natural power to win our freedom. Communism was thus defeated by the power of our nations.

The value of nations is far greater for the citizens of that half of Europe which found itself under Communist rule and then liberated itself than it is in the free and rich West. Because unlike them, we had to fight for our freedom with many of our people paying with their lives for liberty. Meanwhile, in the West, along with other important ideals, national feelings were devalued by despicable rationalism, which created

a fertile soil for manipulation by globalist utopians, helping them to enrich themselves and bolster their influence. Their basic experience of the recent past is different from ours; in their heads, economic prosperity is closely linked with banishing debates among nations about history, sometimes even traducing their own traditions and faiths, while elevating a constructionist ideology without roots to weaken national feelings and endorse a procedural constitutionalism devoid of national content.

Diverging historical experiences are certainly an important reason why sovereignists find themselves in opposition to European federalism, which is a representative of supranational globalism. But that doesn't make our knowledge valueless or disposable. One of the main causes of the crisis is the failure of the Union ever to adapt its mostly informal and less rule-oriented methods of crawling from one compromise to

another to the new situation, whereby its area and population had expanded to cover almost the whole continent. Meanwhile it concentrated on surviving the present rather than setting future goals. The leaders of the founding West European members of the Union resist with might and main even the slightest change to their erstwhile successful solutions. I admit that is also a kind of respect for tradition or conservatism...

Nowadays the most important dividing line in the great debate on the future of Europe lies just here, between the ideas of nation versus federation. Issues of national entity and identity, of the legal capacity and sovereignty of member states arise so sharply because the two constituent parts of the Union, East and West, find it hard to get along over this fundamental conundrum. We hold this as an important problem, the resolution of which is crucial for success. It is perhaps precisely one of our historical missions to smuggle the

advantages of national bonds and of equality back into the system which is becoming increasingly formalised, hierarchical, rigid and authoritarian while slowly losing the confidence of the citizens. We are convinced that on this basis it is possible to recover citizens' trust, intellectual courage and political innovation – if the will is there.

There are still huge question marks beside the European Union experiment which deliberately and consciously defines itself as an anti-imperial empire and which is an integral part of the conceptual realm of supranational governance. It is not yet settled forever which of the two kinds of trends – the imperial or the sovereignist – will prove stronger. The signals we have been getting lately do not prompt great optimism, but things might and hopefully will change soon.

The great question is whether a sombre compromise is possible between the East and the West of the Union – the national governments and the Brussels centre; a compromise of the kind that can unite the principle of equality with sufficient efficiency to enable us to strengthen Europe's role on the world stage. That requires guarantees for the nations cooperating within European integration not to feel themselves at the mercy of others. The great question is whether national sovereignties can roll back the automatisms which offend them with increasing strength and frequency and which ceaselessly shift powers towards Brussels. We also face the activist endeavours of certain powerful political circles to impose their hopelessly-biased ideological ambitions, which have been defeated at the national level, on member states by making them matters for judges to decide through the legal machinery of the European Union and the so-called rule-of-law mechanism.

The destructive impact of overreach by the centre is signalled by a huge earthquake such as Brexit, which has shaken the foundations of everything. Whether we can still turn back from today's not-too encouraging state of affairs towards a strong, equal and voluntary cooperation of European nations, or whether the continent stumbles irreversibly towards becoming an empire, will be decided within a few years. This is also up to us.

We must also make it absolutely clear that in an imperial system there is no place for real democracy. Make no mistake! Take the example of the pioneering and even exemplary system of the erstwhile British Empire, where democracy was mainly limited to its European territories. This confirms the arguments in favour of nation-based democracy and its character as an antidote. It is fashionable nowadays to brand as populists, in a knee-jerk reaction, those who lay the

accent on the first part of the term democracy – that is demos, the people.

Meanwhile, we are witnessing the deployment of the forces of globalist utopianism on all fronts, on the side of the troops marching against majoritarian, that is democratic, solutions; on the side of the aggressive, ‘battering ram’, single issue (single-minded) or outright individualist forces mangling nation-states from below. They are doing so under the pretext of defending fictitious fundamental rights of every individual on the one hand, while on the other supporting forces that are legitimised by international organisations in their efforts to disintegrate national sovereignty and states based on majoritarian elections. We are witnessing disputes about that on international, European and national levels alike. Weapons used in this conflict are exaggerated individualist doctrines, ‘the rule of law’ interpreted in contradiction to democracy, judicialisa-

tion of political decisions and substituting juristocracy – the rule of judges – for democracy.

There is one thing of which we can be certain – branding nationhood, the emotional aspiration of national communities, as a mere source of conflicts and ejecting it from among the pillars of our changing world order amounts to suicide. If we want to bequeath peace, security, democracy and the European order of civic rights to our children and grandchildren, then we cannot tear apart the threads of national communities that define us and guarantee the basis of our very existence. Those who intend to create a shared European or global human identity, basing it not on national citizenships but against them, by eliminating them, are building the future on sand. What is more, they are playing with fire. We share De Gaulle’s vision of this – that a strong Europe can only be based on strong nations. Bolstering communal, family, national

cohesion is the real antidote. It can help us to preserve the best gains we inherited from our forefathers and save Christian Western civilisation, as well as our freedom, peace and European way of life that has been won at the price of so much suffering.

Looking at Zrínyi's example and the programme his book proposes against Turkish *afium*, it appears clear to us that its goals are still valid: preserving Hungary, guaranteeing its existence, promoting its survival, bolstering it as a legal entity. It is precisely that entity which is questioned by the forces on one side of the worldwide struggle described above when they urge the elimination of nation-states. When, within the LIBE Committee, a Dutch left-liberal lady MEP told Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó – who represented a government that had just won two thirds of parliamentary seats with half the votes cast – that he had no right to speak on behalf of the Hungarian people, because

not all Hungarians had voted for him; and that what's more, such a thing as 'Hungarians' doesn't even exist, she represented that exact way of thinking in its barest and most extreme form. Mrs Sophie in 't Veld said this just after having assured the audience that she, on the other hand, was scorning the Hungarian cabinet minister on behalf of all Europeans...

However, for a Hungarian politician committed to his or her nation there can be no question more substantial than that of our sovereignty and our legal entity. We can shape and develop our systems of cooperation following our interests, our readiness to compromise, our temperament and the changing advantages we expect from them, but we can never for one minute doubt that the nation of Hungary is the main unit that we have to keep alive and bolster.

This is the one thing that must guide our actions in the first place. *'Our noble liberty under the skies is nowhere but in Pannonia'*.⁴

Ferenc Kölcsey's even more straightforward words – *'Country comes first!*' – must be simply and unequivocally declared today because, just as in the past, questioning our sovereignty, national legal capacity and communal destiny, as well as appealing for help from foreign troops in internal political battles, has become fashionable in certain circles within our own country. That attitude is reminiscent of the worst period of our history. Compatriots asking foreign battalions to intervene are jeopardising our country's hard-won independence. Those who are doing so in our days prove they have not learnt the bloody

lesson of the destruction caused by either Trianon or the Nazis or the Communists.

Over 300 years ago, Zrínyi argued that if the Turks were to be chased out by others instead of by us, then we would find ourselves paralysed once more; therefore the only correct path to follow was steeling our own strength. The same is true today. The starting point in shaping our relations with the European Union, with our neighbours throughout this region who are so similar to us, but also with the forces and powers who are able to influence the fate of the world, can still not be anything other than our legal capacity as a nation. That implies rinsing a colonial mentality from heads that are too accustomed to bow.

You can gain strength first of all from your own resources. *'Therefore, discovering our own imperfections*

4 Miklós Zrínyi: Don't Hurt my Hungarians!

*at the outset, we will find it easier to find the right antidote thereafter.*⁵

Once we stop the demographic decline; once we strengthen our families; once we do our job intelligently and diligently; once we make our economy competitive; once we re-industrialise our country; once taxation that has favoured the rich becomes more equitable; once our lethal indebtedness that made us dependent and put us at other people's ransom is ended; once we protect our borders and the safety of the population; once we reunite the vital energies of our great nation; once we stand up for our rights; once we shape cooperation with our partners in joint action that will make us successful (too). That is, once we become self-confident. That's where our own power and success will derive from.

5 Miklós Zrínyi: Don't Hurt my Hungarians!

Our own power can also be decisive in the kinds of intellectual and political battles we have to join. Recent years have proven that justice and wisdom are not dependent on the size of the forces representing them. Hungary, a small country, has broken one stupid but purportedly universal taboo after another and has overridden supposedly unquestionable necessities. 'Taxation cannot be extended to the untouchable multinationals!'; 'The medicine for demographic decline is immigration!'; 'Migration cannot be stopped by building fences'... The blows we have endured below the belt are being inflicted upon us because our deeds have shown to the whole world that those false or outdated doctrinaire theses are invalid. In a world order to which there were supposedly no alternatives, we showed the power of national action and will to change the course of events as well as the way to follow or rediscover paths that have been uncharted or blocked by the thought-police. We need elbow room as well

as courage and unquestioned Hungarian statehood to be able to continue doing so in the future. To do whatever strengthens Hungary and its people, we will always need the liberty to act freely. That implies we must be sure about having the most elementary tools at our disposal – and if that is not the case, we are the ones who must create them or get them back. There is nothing new in all of this – our ancestors found it worth sacrificing their lives for these principles if need be – because they are the most basic ingredients of sovereignty: territory; border; population; sovereign power; material force; international legal capacity and determination to overcome all hurdles.

We have taken on intellectual and legal battles within the Union – although being scorned by defeatists saying that we were triggering unnecessary conflicts – because we could not risk being deprived once again of some of the hard-won instruments of our sovereignty.

First, we were told that borders could not be protected. Then attempts were made to prevent us from defending ourselves. There is still an ongoing drive to deprive us of the powers of border protection and transfer them to Union agencies. When we eventually rejected all that and built a fence, securing our borders, stopping migration by ourselves, then came the hypocritical idea of redistribution quotas meant to smuggle in through the back door stillborn ideas violating sovereignty and inflating the power of Union bodies, which amounted to depriving us of a fundamental right of all nations. We are witnessing continuous attempts to wrest away our agency over our sovereign territory – the protection of our borders; the composition of our population and material resources – by pressurising us through diverse bureaucratic, political and budgetary procedures, invoking the most cunning juridical manoeuvres.

We joined the struggle for global intellectual influence because we think that our knowledge and historical experience may contribute to making decisions more favourable for the future of the world. And most of all because by standing up for our principles, actions and achievements, we hope to create a framework which allows us to find the best way to represent our own interests. We are interested in creating an international system which offers the most favourable conditions for making the people of Hungary stronger. That is why we are members of the European Union, because our participation in the construction of Europe may guarantee in the long run the best conditions for our economy, our prosperity and the well-being of our people. Being able to sell the products of our work, to trade, travel and work in the European and international environment peacefully, without borders, customs and protectionist hurdles is a huge opportunity, made possible by our Union membership.

It opens enormous long-time prospects for Hungary's economy, Hungarian enterprises and Hungarians at large. This plural includes all Hungarians as a fundamental resource, including those living beyond Hungary's borders. Having at our disposal such a free, great, creative and innovative space has only happened in rare moments of our history. Hungary as a legal entity, with its own legal capacity and sovereignty, means that in the huge cooperative European system we have our own interests, are conscious of them, represent them and fight for them. This is how we want to shape and influence European cooperation – in a way that it can meet our interests as much as possible.

When trying specifically to apply all that to the European Union, we may say that, in an effort to help our economy develop, we are interested in all schemes that guarantee broad horizontal economic freedom. We would like the least possible amount of

protectionist regulations that keep tight limitations on the economy. In terms of public law, we stand for a cooperative Union in opposition to the endeavours of constraint, directives, sanctions, overregulation and ceaseless attempts to broaden Brussels' powers. We must, therefore, insist on the principle of equality of member states' rights. We must return to the principle that Europe should not interfere with the affairs of the nations over and above the powers that the member states have relinquished.

Sargentini-type reports which generate internal splits and senseless conflicts within the European Union are entirely out of place. If Swedes do not want to support their families in childbearing, they don't have to; but they shouldn't tell us whether we should want a high number of Hungarian children to be born. It is up to us Hungarians and the rest of the European nations to decide what type of common future we opt

for and we have a strong voice there – sometimes even out of proportion to our strength. If the rest of the member countries and the centre of the Union respect the sphere of action allotted to the nations, then we must also be ready for the compromises and sacrifices necessary for the kind of European cooperation which forms the basis for the success of our common cause. We must be ready to pay the membership fee. All for one, one for all.

Following the lessons of Zrínyi's 'Turkish *afium*' and of our own often tragic history, we must realise that we have always got to be strong enough to make the best of circumstances that we are not always able to shape. No matter from which side the winds of history blow, whether they are weak or strong, we must be strong enough to prevent the helm of our craft, Hungary, from being wrenched out of our hands. We gladly sail in a joint convoy with others, helping and strength-

ening each other, but we must always be able freely to take decisions on the most fundamental issues – on who we are; how and where we are heading; what we want to become. Because as far as we are concerned, Hungary comes first.

You can hear quite a lot of battle noise around us. Shots are coming from friend and foe alike. But over the years ahead, important matters will have to be decided.

I have assembled here a somewhat random list of opiates, delusional doctrines, and their antidotes, the spiritual and practical remedies. The opiates, as with all proper psychedelic drugs, are shining, new and intellectually neat and faultless. They guarantee good vibrations. Traditional, repeatedly-proven pills, the old ones we have been used to, are sometimes bitter because they are not always sugar-coated. By taking

them, we can suffer side-effects – be it headache or diarrhoea. We humans are malleable; we have a propensity to be dazzled by glittering objects and the ripples on the surface. Our present world which is relinquishing its own identity, losing its capacity for self-defence and the safeguarding of its values as well as its capacity to pass them on to the next generation, is therefore in need of swift spiritual renewal.

Conservatism in its noble sense never means a lack of change; nor does it mean it is impossible to renew ourselves and the world. That is something being spread about by its bitter opponents. On the other hand, all good conservatives know that if a renewal of things is not based on the existing, on experience, then our castles built from our desires in the air will crumble and bury us under their rubble. If when choosing our antidotes, we are not led by our well-proven and repeatedly-tested fundamental ideals – nation,

freedom, family, community, Christianity, faith and fidelity – then we won't be able to win our great battle against the new, fresh, handsome, red-faced and tempting opiates flooding the world.

If we are confident of our own power, then we won't ever be broken by anyone – including those with the most money and power. Zrínyi's 'Don't Hurt my Hungarians' ends with a sentence that shows patriots the direction to follow. 'Volenti nihil difficile!' (We can achieve anything if we want. Nothing is too difficult in the presence of goodwill!)

In other words, the main antidote to the opium of utopian globalism is strengthening the national threads that bind us together and cleverly building our national home, while never losing sight of the surrounding world.

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